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Abstract
This article analyzes current practices of conversion to Evangelical Christianity from the perspec-
tive of a contentious relation between state and society in Algeria. Based on a pragmatist 
approach to religion as a contextual and practical accomplishment, this study shows how 
Evangelical Christianity has provided converts with a new understanding of freedom that is 
based on the cultivation of a pure faith. It examines how this renewed piety contributes to the 
formation of an alternative ideal of the Algerian nation, one that contradicts the Arabo-Islamist 
FLN imposed narrative. Drawing upon observations gathered during several research trips in 
Kabylia, Algiers and Oran, this paper does not seek to develop a general theory of Muslim con-
versions in the Muslim world. Rather, it presents the ways in which conversion is practiced and 
explained by Algerian converts within the specific political and cultural context in which they 
live. It shows how converts’ discourse and practice connect global Evangelical themes to claims 
and contentions that emerge specifically from Algerian political and religious history. In doing 
so, it seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussions of the complex ways in which 
global Pentecostalism blends into local cultures.
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In March 2008, Habiba Kouider, an Algerian convert to Christianity, was 
arrested on her bus journey from Oran to Tiaret. When she was searched, 
police found several copies of the Bible in her purse. On May 20, 2008, the 
attorney of the Tiaret court charged Habiba with “preaching a non-Muslim 
religion without authorization,” and required a conviction of three years’ 
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imprisonment against her.1 Since then, images of burnt churches and stories 
of imprisoned converts and expelled missionaries have become a central ele-
ment of public debates about religious freedom in North Africa. Most media 
analysts find such events puzzling,2 and contend that in a context of highly 
restricted religious freedoms, conversion can only be a response to frustration 
or greed: the hope of receiving a visa to a Western country is, it has been 
argued, the main motivation for Muslim conversions.3 As simplistic as it is, 
this explanation echoes a well-established scholarly and political narrative 
about Islamic conversions in which the sincerity and authenticity of Muslim 
converts is consistently questioned.
Religious change in North Africa has generally been examined from two 
points of view—namely, legalist and ethnic—which are both questioned in 
this article. Scholarly analyses of conversions in a Muslim context have typi-
cally approached the issue of religious change from the legalist (and asocio-
logical) perspective of Islamic jurisprudence.4 These studies focus more on 
what Islamic norms, defined independently from the social and historical con-
text in which they are shaped, theoretically authorize or prohibit than on the 
actual practices and motivations of converts. This approach has contributed to 
confining the study of Muslim conversions to normative debates about apos-
tasy, which assume that the clash between Islam and Christianity is the only 
relevant paradigm in which to elucidate practices of conversions.
Second, in a specifically Algerian context, Berber exceptionalism is a central 
factor referenced by scholars and media analysts in order to explain any form 
of religious, political, or cultural change. From this point of view, Christian 
1) On May 27, 2008, the criminal court of Tiaret decided to report the sentence.
2) US Department of State, Report on International Religious Freedom, 2009, http://www
.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/index.htm, (chapter on “Algeria”)
3) As simplistic as it is, this explanation echoes a well-established scholarly and political narrative 
about Islamic conversions in which the sincerity and authenticity of Muslim converts are consis-
tently questioned.
With regards to missionaries’ tendency to question the sincerity of Muslim converts’ motives, see 
Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the 
Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); and Karima Dirèche-Slimani, Chrétiens de 
Kabylie: Une action missionnaire dans l’Algérie coloniale (Paris: Bouchene, 2004). A large part of 
the scholarship on Islamism in North Africa draws upon a similar suspicion regarding the 
authenticity of Islamist actors. It suggests that the issues of sincerity and authenticity are not 
specific to the study of North African Christians, but concern the study of religious change in 
North Africa more broadly.
4) Abdullah Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); and
M.E. Subhani, Apostasy in Islam (New Delhi: Global Media Publications, 2005).
N. Marzouki / Middle East Law and Governance 4 (2012) 69–105 71
conversions in Algeria are merely a manifestation of the Kabylians’ attempts to 
be recognized as a distinct cultural and political minority. Although today’s 
convert communities do indeed include more Kabylians than Arabs, explain-
ing conversions to Christianity as a mere expression of Berber differentialism 
is highly problematic for two reasons. First, it gives credit to the “Berber 
myth,” developed by the French government during the colonial era in order 
to support its policy of divide and rule.5 Because of its close ties to the colonial 
project of alienating Berbers from Arabs, any explanation resorting to the 
notion of a supposedly Berber particularism is extremely suspicious. Moreover, 
this argument completely ignores the long history of activism by Protestant 
missions in Kabylia. Rather than an expression of a supposedly innate affinity 
between Berbers and Western Christian culture, the success of Evangelical 
Christianity among Kabyles is more adequately explained as a consequence of 
the sustained work of numerous Protestant missions in that area of Algeria.6
Rejecting a strict legalist or Berberist narrative, this article instead demon-
strates that current practices of conversion to Evangelical Christianity are 
more productively understood from the perspective of a contentious relation 
between state and society in Algeria. Instead of speculating about the sincerity 
(or lack thereof ) of converts’ motivations, this article is interested in showing 
how Evangelical Christianity has provided converts with a new understanding 
of freedom that is based on the cultivation of a pure faith. It examines how this 
renewed piety contributes to the formation of an alternative ideal of the 
5) This expression refers to a central assumption of French colonial policy in North Africa,
according to which the various Berber groups were racially superior to the Arabs, and closer to 
the Euro-Christian civilization. This myth played a major role in the policy of divide-and-rule 
that the French government implemented. For example, in May 1930, the French protectorate 
issued the infamous Berber Dahir (Decree) in order to establish a separate regime of justice for 
the Berbers. Arab and Berber Moroccans violently resisted this policy, in which they saw an 
attempt to divide the Moroccan population and strengthen French power. See Dahbia Abrous, 
La société des missionnaires d’Afrique à l’épreuve du mythe berbère: Kabylie, Aurès, Mzab (Dudley, 
MA: Peeters, 2007); Alain Mahé, Histoire de la Grande Kabylie, XIXe ~ XXe siècles. Anthropologie 
historique du lien social dans les communautés villageoises (Paris: Editions Bouchène, 2001); 
Charles-Robert Ageron, “Le ‘mythe kabyle’ et la politique kabyle,” in Les Algériens musulmans et 
la France, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 267-92; and Charles-Robert 
Ageron, “La politique kabyle de 1898 à 1918,” in Les Algériens musulmans et la France, vol. 2 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 873-90.
6) As for the reason why Protestant missions often chose to first settle in Kabylia, examination of 
the NAM and the Methodist Mission archives suggests that the first Protestant missionaries were 
attracted to the area by trivial motives, such as Kabylia’s weather and environment (rather than 
by the so-called predisposition of Kabylian souls to Christianity).
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Algerian nation, one that contradicts the Arabo-Islamist FLN imposed 
narrative.
Based on a pragmatist approach to religion as a contextual and practical 
accomplishment,7 this article assumes that there is no predetermined distinc-
tion between appropriate and inappropriate meanings or goals for religious 
action. The following discussion instead seeks to acknowledge and emphasize 
the blurred distinction between religion and politics that characterizes the 
experience of Algerian Christians. Rather than trying to arbitrarily define phe-
nomena as religious or political, this article attempts to work from within the 
ambiguous religio-political space that characterizes Algerian Evangelical 
expressions. Converts do not relate their religious practice to a broader politi-
cal state-oriented enterprise, similar to the one that informed the Islamists’ 
project in the 1990s. However, the conception of “religion” that they pro-
pound—as salvation rather than as obligation—and their vehement critique 
of state interference with religious practice entails a de facto attempt at separa-
tion from state control. As such, Algerian conversions can be explained as a 
practice oriented toward the detachment from state rule, as an art of stateless-
ness. Importantly, the notion of statelessness within the present discussion 
should not be interpreted as a functionalist and reductive reading of converts’ 
practice. It is not argued that Algerians convert in order to challenge state rule, 
but rather that in the context of the state’s attempt to monopolize religious 
expression and nationalist meanings, converts’ practice inevitably entails a 
redefinition of their relation to the state and to the nationalist narrative.
This article is based on observations gathered during several research trips in 
Kabylia, Algiers and Oran. Instead of developing a general theory of Muslim 
conversions in the Muslim world, it presents the ways in which conversion is 
practiced and explained by Algerian converts within the specific political and 
cultural context in which they live. As will be shown, a number of the argu-
ments articulated by Algerian converts—most notably regarding their 
approach to religion—are common themes of Christian Evangelical discourse 
worldwide. The intent of this paper is not to make a case for the uniqueness of 
Algerian Christianity, but rather to show how converts’ discourse and practice 
connect these global Evangelical themes to claims and contentions that emerge 
specifically from Algerian political and religious history. In doing so, it seeks 
7) Philippe Gonzalez, “Reclaiming the (Swiss) Nation for God: The Politics of Charismatic
Prophecy,” Etnografica 12, no. 2 (2008): 425-51; and Philippe Gonzalez, “Religion as a Practical 
Accomplishment” (paper presented at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 
February 15, 2011).
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to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussions of the complex ways in 
which global Pentecostalism blends into local cultures.8
To achieve the above-noted ends of this paper, I first provide evidence that 
challenges the assumption according to which the success of Christianity in 
Algeria is a recent phenomenon, caused by external pressure and foreign 
missionaries’ proselytizing activities. I then turn to the analysis of the 2006 
law against proselytizing, showing how the law’s advocates rationalize it as a 
defense of public order and state power rather than as an attack against 
Christianity. Finally, I explain how, through their redefinition of religion, con-
verts come to reject state interference in religious affairs rather than radically 
dismissing Islam. This religious practice, contrary to other forms of compara-
ble pietism movements such as Salafi groups, is neither purely oriented toward 
the construction of a moral self nor toward the global “umma” (i.e., beyond 
the boundaries of the nation). Instead, the practices and narratives of converts 
are significantly influenced by an attempt to redefine the past and future of the 
Algerian nation.
An Algerian Protestantism
It is herein argued that contemporary waves of conversions are not primarily 
caused by external pressure, as many alarmist reports contend, but instead 
represent the continuation and expansion of the long and overlooked presence 
of Protestantism in Algeria. Mustapha Krim became the first Algerian President 
of the Association de l’Eglise Protestante d’Algerie in 2007, an association that 
had been led only by non-Algerian pastors since its creation in 1972. This 
event is largely considered to be a major turning point in the history of 
Christianity in Algeria. It can also be understood not as a break from, but as a 
consequence of, the long and robust work of Protestant missionaries since the 
end of the 19th century. The general bewilderment of the Western public 
regarding Christian conversions in Algeria is surprising when one considers 
the extensive history of Protestant entrenchment in Algeria and the granting 
of religious freedom by the Algerian constitution.
8) For instance, see Joel Robbins, “The Globalization of Pentecostal and Charismatic
Christianity,” Annual Review of Anthropology 33 (2004): 117-43; and Simon Coleman, The 
Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity: Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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Though they have been comparatively less studied than their Catholic 
counterparts,9 Protestant missions have been active in Algeria since the end of 
the 19th century. In 1881, the U.K. based “Mission to the Kabyles” —renamed 
“North Africa Mission” (NAM) in 1883—established its first station in a 
small village located approximately 20 miles east from Tizi Ouzou, Djemaa 
Sahridj.10 In 1908, the U.S. based Episcopal Methodist Church Mission 
established its first station in Fort National (now Larba Irathen).11 These two 
missions did not see their role as one of mere witnessing to Christ in Muslim 
land, nor did they target the European community only. Rather, they firmly 
intended to work toward the formation of an indigenous Church composed 
of Arab and Kabylian converts. Insofar as an exhaustive presentation of the 
history of Protestant missions in the region is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, suffice it to point at the significant connection between a large 
number of Algerian converts today, notably self-proclaimed church pastors, 
and the Methodist Church. A large majority of converts and church leaders 
with whom I worked admitted that direct or indirect contact with pastors or 
members of the Methodist missions had played a major role in their own spiri-
tual journey. Even though these testimonies may not be sufficient to prove a 
direct influence of a single church on the formation of current convert com-
munities, they clearly show that Protestantism has been part of Algerian reli-
gious sociology since well before the last decade. Moreover, an analysis of the 
relation between French colonial government and Protestant missions until 
the 1930s reveals the existence of a long tradition of the state monitoring 
Evangelical proselytizing. Testimonies and field reports of missionaries of the 
NAM and the Methodist Mission all emphasize the initial distrust of the 
French colonial government toward Protestant missions,12 which were seen 
alternatively as a threat to French Islamic policy in Algeria or as undercover 
9) Jean-Claude Ceillier, Histoire des Missionnaires d’Afrique, Pères Blancs: De la fondation par
Mgr Lavigerie à la mort du fondateur (Paris: Karthala, 2008).
10) For a testimony regarding the North Africa Mission, see Francis Rue Steele, Not in Vain: The
Story of North Africa Mission (Pasadena: William Carrey Library, 1981).
11) William Heggoy, Fifty Years of Evangelical Missionary Movement in North Africa, 1881-1931
(PhD diss., Hartford Seminary, 1960), 190.
12) In 1890, Pastor James Stephens of the North Africa Mission stated in his field report: “There
is not in Algeria the facility for open-air work that there is in many mission fields. Of course, in 
a small cluster of purely native dwellings one might be permitted to speak to the men openly. But 
wherever one is under the observation of the French authorities the open-air preaching would be 
disallowed.” Quoted in Steele, Not in Vain, 32.
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British spies. This distrust suggests that, from the outset, the attempt to 
constrain the development of Evangelical Christianity has had more to do 
with state control than with a conflict of civilizations.
Turning to the rights that the Algerian Constitution grants to religious minor-
ities, the law proves to be relatively liberal concerning religious freedom—
especially compared to the more restrictive legislation of other Muslim 
countries.13 Despite article 2 of the Constitution, which defines Islam as the 
state religion, article 29 recognizes the equality of all citizens and bans dis-
crimination based on race and gender. Article 36 establishes freedom of con-
sciousness and opinion as inviolable liberties, and article 43 grants citizens the 
right to create associations, including religious associations. Conversion and 
apostasy are not considered a criminal offense.
No assured data exists that documents the exact number of Evangelical 
Christians currently living in Algeria. Although the number of Catholics is 
estimated to be 12,000 (including a majority of Catholic students from Sub-
Saharan Africa), Christian religious leaders I interviewed suggest that there 
may be 20,000 to 30,000 Evangelical Christians. The social and demographic 
background of these converts is extremely diverse. All generations are present 
at Church services, and most converts explain how they eventually managed 
to persuade at least one family member to change religion. As a matter of fact, 
converts’ communities are very much audiences of families rather than of 
individuals. While a minority of converts are unemployed young men, the 
majority of Evangelical Algerians belong to the lower and upper middle class. 
They are teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, shopkeepers, and small business 
owners. In other words, the appeal of Evangelical Christianity to Algerians 
cannot be explained in the same reductive way that the success of Islamism so 
often has. Algerian Evangelical Christianity is neither a religion of the margin-
alized nor of the outcasts. Conversions cannot be explained as “conversions de 
la misère,” as they were described in the early 20th century.14 Given that, his-
torically and constitutionally, conversions to Protestant Christianity do not 
appear as an eccentric or sacrilegious phenomenon, and no clear social profile 
seems to define the majority of converts, how, then, can one make sense of this 
practice and of the controversy that it has caused?
13) US Department of State, Report on International Religious Freedom.
14) Dirèche-Slimani, Chrétiens de Kabylie, 27.
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The 2006 Ordinance, State legibility15 and public order
Making Evangelical Christianity legible
On February 28, 2006, the government passed Ordinance 06-03, which spec-
ifies the exact conditions in which non-Muslim religions can be legally prac-
ticed. Importantly, the Ordinance is not rationalized as a theological defense 
of Islam against Christianity; rather, it asserts the mundane necessity for the 
state to protect weak and credulous groups within the society against the 
insidious threat of destabilizing forces. Indeed, the ordinance does create an 
imbalance in the treatment of Christians and Muslims to the extent that it 
only criminalizes attempts to “unsettle the faith of Muslims.” This one-sided 
policy, however, stems from a broader effort by the Algerian state to monitor 
and monopolize religious practice, instead of from a series of truth claims 
regarding the theological superiority of Islam. Although this difference doesn’t 
make the protection of Algerian religious minorities less worrying, it does 
contradict civilizational and essentialist approaches to Muslim conversions.
The preamble of the Ordinance stresses the Algerian state’s tolerance and 
acceptance of non-Muslim religions. Article 2 re-establishes that the state, 
whose religion is Islam, guarantees free exercise of religion, tolerance, and 
respect among religions. Article 3 contends that religious associations other 
than Muslim associations are granted protection from the state. Article 4 pro-
hibits resorting to the notion of religious belonging to justify any form of 
discrimination against individuals or groups.
These important protections, however, are contingent on the requirement 
that religious practice be made clearly recognizable to the state at all times. 
Articles 5 through 9 stress the obligation for religious practice to take place in 
buildings that are officially registered as houses of worship. These places are 
required to be open to the public—a rule that entails the possibility for the 
religious community to reach out to a broader public, but also allows for the 
state to access and monitor the Church sermons and activities. The govern-
ment’s Executive Decree 07-135, issued in May 2007, clarifies article 8 of the 
Ordinance and conditions the gathering of non-Muslim religious services 
upon several criteria. A non-Muslim religious group must request permission 
from the wali, or prefect, to organize a religious event at least five days before 
the scheduled event. The Ordinance calls for the creation of a National 
15) See James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1998.
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Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Services (article 9), dependent on the 
Minister of Religious Affairs and Awqaf. The Commission’s mandate is to pro-
tect religious freedom and give preliminary advice regarding whether or not a 
religious association should be granted an “agreement” (i.e., the government 
authorization necessary for its official registration).16
An ambiguous protection of Islam as metonymy of public order and national 
unity
Despite the fact that the Ordinance’s first articles concern religious practice in 
general and avoid creating any specific hierarchy among religions, the subse-
quent provisions addressing the issue of proselytizing introduce a significant 
imbalance between Muslims and followers of other religions. Articles 10 
through 14 define proselytizing as a criminal offense and explain the criminal 
sentences for persons who do not abide by the law.17  For example, anyone 
using provocative discourse, calling to resist public order, or agitating citizens 
to rebel will receive a sentence of 250,000 dinars and one year of imprison-
ment. The faith of Muslims is specifically protected by the ordinance: a sen-
tence of 500,000 dinars and two years’ imprisonment is set against anyone 
who tries to seduce another into changing religion and to “unsettle” the faith 
of a Muslim. Article 14 states that foreign nationals suspected of proselytizing 
will be expelled. Foreign missionary groups, however, are permitted to con-
duct humanitarian work as long as they do not proselytize.
Several other aspects of Algerian law present a similar emphasis on the pro-
tection of Islam and Muslims. The anti-proselytizing of the 2006 Ordinance 
echoes an analogous constraint established by article 144 bis 2 of the Penal 
Code.18 Many Algerian Christians have been tried under this article,19 which 
16) The government issued Decree 07-158 in June 2007, clarifying the nature and role of this
Commission, which was composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of National 
Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Security, as well as the National Police, the National 
Gendarmerie, and the governmental National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (CNCPPDH).
17) Ordinance 06-03 of February 28, 2006, establishing conditions and rules for the practice of
non Muslim religions : http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/lois_ord_06_08.htm
18) République Algerienne Démocratique et Populaire Ministère de la Justice, Code Pénal, 4ème
ed (2005), http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/legisl_fr_de_06_au_juil_08/code_penal_avec_mod 
_06.pdf.
19) In most cases, however, charges were dropped following the trial. In 2008, 10 men were
charged with “denigrating the dogma or precepts of Islam,” and were tried in September 2008 
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provides for a sentence of three to five years’ imprisonment and 50 000 to 100 
000 Algerian dinars against anyone “insulting the prophet and any of the mes-
sengers of God, or denigrating the creed and precepts of Islam, whether by 
writing, drawing, declaration, or any other means.” For example, Rachid 
Seghir, Youssef Ourahmane and Hamid Ramdani were convicted in absentia 
in January 2008, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 
50 00 dinars.20 The sentence was subsequently reduced to a two-month sus-
pended prison term on appeal in November 2008. This privileged protection 
of Islam and Muslims is also expressed in several other parts of Algerian law, 
such as article 26 of the Information Code of 1990, which censors publica-
tions that are deemed “contrary to Islamic morals, national values, human 
rights.”21 Article 9 of the Constitution states that “Institutions should 
refrain from engaging in practices that are contrary to the Islamic morality and 
to the values of the November revolution.” Most provisions of the Algerian 
Family Code concerning marriage, divorce or inheritance also contradict 
the principle of citizen’s equality provided by article 29 of the Constitution.22 
According to the 2005 amended Family Code, testament executioners 
should be Muslim,23 and persons who have left Islam lose their right to 
inheritance.24
However significant, the imbalance that these various rules introduce in the 
state’s relation to differing religious traditions is based on a profoundly ambig-
uous rationale. What is at stake is not the defense of a transcendental or theo-
logical conception of Islamic truth, but the safeguarding of the authority of 
for breaking the fast during the month of Ramadan. For an exhaustive report of Algerian trials, 
see Amnesty International, Annual Report for Algeria, 2009, http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
annualreport.php?id = ar&yr = 2009&c = DZA. The dropping of charges in most cases clearly 
illustrates the vitality of the judicial and public debate around conversions and religious freedom 
in Algeria.
20) Jo-Anne Prud’homme, “Policing Belief: Algeria,” in Policing Belief: The Impact of Blasphemy
Laws on Human Rights, ed. Courtney C. Radsch (Freedom House, 2010), http://freedomhouse.
org/template.cfm?page = 571, 13-20.
21) Article 26 states: “Periodical and specialized publications, national or foreign, of any nature
and audience, shall not include illustration, story, information or insert that are contrary to 
Islamic morals, national values, human rights, nor advocate for racism, fanaticism or treason” 
(my translation). Chadli Bendjedid, Code de l’Information, April 1990, http://lexalgeria.free.fr/
com.htm.
22) République Algerienne Démocratique et Populaire Ministère de la Justice, Code de la Famille,
4ème ed (2005), http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/code_famille.pdf.
23) Article 93.
24) Article 138.
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the state over society. Islam is defended as the metonymy of public order 
rather than as a sovereign source of truth. What is criminalized by the 2006 
Ordinance is not a form of blasphemy or apostasy, but an attempt to disrupt 
social order and take advantage of credulous individuals. The Ordinance does 
not use the religious expression “fatana,” but the more prosaic “shaking the 
faith” (za’za’at iman ay Muslim). What is deemed punishable in these articles 
is a form of speech that may excite part of the population to sedition. Article 
144 of the Penal Code shows a similar ambiguity between the protection of 
Islam and the protection of the nation state. Interestingly, the provision against 
blasphemy is included in an article whose title does not explicitly refer to 
Islam: “Insult and violence against civil servants and state institutions.” The 
hierarchy of the protections provided by the article also proves quite unex-
pected. Among the persons protected against offense, the article first cites civil 
servants and judges (article 144), then the President of the Republic (article 
144 bis), and only in the third position the Prophet and God’s messengers 
(article 144 bis 2). Moreover, article 77 of the Information Code partially 
qualifies the apparent imbalance among religions introduced by the Penal 
Code by prohibiting not only insults against Islam but also against all the 
other “heavenly religions.”25
The limitations on religious freedom that these norms define are therefore 
better understood in the broader context of the state’s effort to contain soci-
ety’s pluralism than in terms of a transcendental fight over competing truth 
claims. Even though the Ordinance prevents any informal religious gathering 
from taking place, this regulation is not fundamentally different from the one 
governing the state relation to Islamic activities. Article 87 bis 10 of the Penal 
Code establishes that the government must officially authorize imams to lead 
prayers, and that religious services can only take place in mosques recognized 
by the state. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
strictly monitor the study of Islam in public schools, and a number of private 
schools have been refused official accreditation because their curriculum does 
not meet the standards defined by the two ministries. Government-appointed 
religious officials can legally preview sermons of the Friday prayer, and these 
sermons can be censored when they are seen as potentially destabilizing. 
25) Article 77 states: “Whoever offends through writings, sounds, images, drawings, or any other 
means, direct or indirect, Islam and other heavenly religions, will be punished by 6 months to 
3 years of imprisonment and a fine of 10.000 to 50.000 DA or one of these two sentences” (my 
translation). Bendjedid, Code de l’Information.
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Imams are often dismissed, and locations where unauthorized Islamic worship 
takes place are shut down.26
The virulent debate that took place in 2005 around the official recognition 
of the national anthem is a further illustration of this broad effort to appropri-
ate Islamic and nationalist symbols. As a response to a French law passed on 
February 23, 2005,27 which stipulated that scholarly curricula should recog-
nize “the positive role of French presence in North Africa,”28 a group of 
Algerian MPs launched a virulent campaign calling for the protection of the 
national anthem, Qassamem, by the Algerian Constitution.29 As a result of this 
lobbying, article 5 of the Constitution (as amended in 2008) defines Qassamen 
as the official national anthem “in its integrality,” that is, including its third 
aggressively anti-French couplet. 30 Interestingly, most Islamist groups have 
consistently opposed this anthem in their effort to rewrite Algerian national 
history, arguing that only God, and not the profane symbols of the revolution, 
should be revered and sacralized. This dispute over the national anthem clearly 
26) Mohammed Aissa—an official of the Ministry of Religious affairs—explains this measure as 
a response to the increasing influence of Islamic practices that are seen as foreign to Algerian 
Islam, notably under the influence of Saudi Arabia or Iran.
27) République Française, Loi n°2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la 
Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés (1), http://www.legifrance 
.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte = LEGITEXT000006051312&dateTexte = 20110331.
28) This highly controversial formulation was modified by a decree issued on February 16, 2006. 
The law now states that academic research programs “grant the history of the French presence 
abroad, notably in North Africa, the place it deserves.” République Française, Loi n°2005-158 
du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des 
Français rapatriés (1), http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid = C445EDA
D85DDB04FAC4DA4186D170E9D.tpdjo12v_3?idArticle = LEGIARTI000006 
238939&cidTexte = JORFTEXT000000444898&categorieLien = id&dateTexte = 20110331.
29) The third paragraph of the hymn states: “O France, the time of reproach has passed./And we 
have closed like a book;/ O France, the day of reckoning is at hand./ So prepare to receive from 
us our answer!/ In our revolution is the end of empty talk;/ and we have resolved that Algeria 
shall live.” The anthem’s complete text is quoted on the Algerian presidency Web site, as part of 
the “symbols of the state.” See http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/symbole/hymne/symbolefr.
htm. With regards to this debate, see Chérif Benadji, “Révision de la Constitution: Vers une 
présidence à vie pour Abdelaziz Bouteflika,” in L’Année du Maghreb V (Centre national de la 
recherché scientifique [France] et L’Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et 
musulman, 2009), 225-61.
30) Article 5 states: “The national emblem and national anthem are conquests of the Revolution 
of November 1, 1954. They are unchangeable.... The National anthem is ‘Qassamen’ in the 
integrality of its strophes” (my translation). Constitution de la République Algerienne Démocratique 
et Populaire, http://www.joradp.dz/
HFR/Consti.htm.
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illustrates what some scholars have defined as an Islamonationalist attitude of 
the state, in its effort to sacralize the memory of the revolution and to safe-
guard the myth of a perfectly united national body. In 2008, when inter-
communal violence occurred among Arab Sunnis and Berber Ibadites in the 
Mzab, government officials once again resorted to this same argument of a 
threat to social order and national unity to justify their timid support to the 
Ibadites. Indeed, public order is broadly conceived as an order aimed at 
defending the Islamic character of the Algerian nation.
Furthermore, the criminalization of proselytizing in the name of public 
order and the banishing of apostasy in the name of Islam are, to a certain 
extent, based on a similar rationale—namely, the condemnation of the public-
ity of the deviant thought (rather than the thought itself ).31 In other words, 
the conversion controversy and the state’s reference to the notoriously open 
concept of public order32 show how the religious-secular divide is being con-
textually produced and contested, rather than existing as a predefined histori-
cal structure. In Algeria, the state strategically plays with the blurred distinction 
between Islam as a metonymy of secular public order and Islam as a religious 
reference. Yet, in order to safeguard national unity and social stability, it also 
calls for a clear distinction between the circumscribed space of non-Islamic 
religions and the public space, as well as demands a clear definition of 
religion.33
31) See Mouna Mohammed Cherif, “La Conversion ou l’apostasie entre le système juridique
musulman et les lois constitutionnelles dans l’Algérie indépendante,” Cahiers d’études du reli-
gieux. Recherches interdisciplinaires (Special Edition, February 2011), http://cerri.revuews.
org/809, 23; and Jean-Noël Ferrié and Baudouin Dupret, “Participer au pouvoir, c’est édicter la 
norme: Sur l’affaire Abu Zayd,” Revue française de science politique 48 (1997): 762-775.
32) With regards to the comparable usage of the reference to public order in the context of
Egyptian inter-religious conflict, see Maurtis S. Berger, “Secularizing inter-religious laws in 
Egypt,” Islamic Law and Society 12, no. 3 (2005): 395-418; Johanna Pink, “A Post-Quranic 
Religion between Apostasy and Public Order: Egyptian Muftis and Courts on the Legal Status 
of the Baha’i Faith,” Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 3 (2003): 409-34; and Hussein Ali Agrama, 
“Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious State?” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 52, no. 3 (2010): 495-523.
33) A similar argument was put forward in September 2008, when six men were sentenced in
Biskra for breaking the Ramadan fast, as well as in September 2009, when two French citizens 
from Algerian origin broke the fast in public. In both cases, that which the judges deemed pun-
ishable were not the inner beliefs that precipitated the break in fast, but rather the disruptive 
consequences of such an action on the public order. See, US Department of State, Report on 
International Religious Freedom, 2009http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148812.htm
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Islamists’ nationalist approach to Evangelical Christianity
Significantly, the discourse of Islamist leaders, who were among the most vocal 
supporters of the 2006 Ordinance, is based on a similar rationale of state-
society relation, and makes no reference to a conflict between Islam and 
Christianity. Colonialism, and not religious war, is the lens through which 
most Islamists analyzed the threat of Evangelical proselytizing. In an interview 
(Quotidien d’Oran, March 31, 2008), Bouabdellah Ghlamallah, the Minister 
of Religious Affairs, justified the expelling of Hugh Johnson, an American 
Methodist Pastor and President of the Eglise Protestante d’Algérie until 2007, 
by referring to national security and unity: “We do not want to prevent people 
from changing religion. But we are telling converts that Algeria is targeted by 
Evangelists (évangélisateurs). The interest of the nation must come before 
everything. The most important thing is to safeguard our homeland.”
In another interview with the French Christian Magazine La Vie, Ghlamallah 
went so far as to declare that he would not oppose his own son’s decision to 
convert, granted he was assured that his son had not been coerced into making 
such a choice: “If my son converted to Christianity, I would not resent him. 
I don’t say it would be easy. But I believe in freedom of consciousness. The 
path toward God is not single but is multicolored. You accept that Christians 
convert to Islam. But I cannot accept the fact that Christians buy conscious-
nesses.”34 A member of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulamas whom 
I interviewed in December 2009 insisted on the distinction between the 
notions of plurality (ta´adoudiya) and division (inqisam). While the former, he 
explained, is a positive notion that reflects the natural organization of human 
affairs and is compatible with equality among different groups, the latter gives 
rise to hierarchies similar to the ones that divided Algerian society in the colo-
nial period. The Association of Algerian Muslim Ulamas (AAMU) does not 
reject the notion of a pluralist Algeria, but rather insists on how premature 
such an ideal is. Algerian society, he argues, is still too fragile, too weakened by 
the consequences of colonialism not to be unsettled by Christian minority 
groups. Similarly, an Islamist MP, who is a member of Movement of Society 
for Peace (MSP) that currently holds 9% of seats in Parliament and is a mem-
ber of the government coalition (with Rassemblement National Démocratique 
and FLN), contends that the controversy around conversion is primarily a 
political conspiracy aimed at destabilizing Algeria. Equally determinant in the 
argument of Islamic officials and government Islamists is the memory of the 
34) Jean-Pierre Denis, “Algérie, La Poussée évangélique,” La Vie, August 18, 2008.
N. Marzouki / Middle East Law and Governance 4 (2012) 69–105 83
“Black Decade” of civil war sparked by various extremist groups. The notion 
that the state’s monitoring of religious change is key to the safeguarding of the 
still fragile social stability after ten years of interpersonal violence appears very 
clearly in a statement made by the minister Ghlamallah in a conference orga-
nized by the Ministry of Religious Affairs on February 11, 2010: “Either we 
resist, or we ask the state to renounce its responsibilities and to let its people 
do whatever they want in the name of religion. Algeria already paid a much 
too high price for this, and we won’t fall into that trap again.”35
Although state and Islamist officials focus on the “foreign” nature of 
Evangelical Christianity, converts’ arguments emphasize the indigenous 
dimension of Christianity. In this light, the debate between Christians and 
their opponents is not one that pits Christianity against Islam, but rather one 
that reflects conflict between foreign and indigenous Christianity. Indeed, 
François Burgat has shown that the particularity of Algerian Islamism lies in 
its close relation to anti-colonialism and nationalism.36 Islamists’ discourse 
about conversion is an anti-colonial, nationalist discourse of political and cul-
tural resistance, not a theological rejection of Christianity. This argument 
echoes the long tradition within Algerian Islamic reformism of defending 
what Jacques Berque called “Jacobin Islam,” a phrase “suggestive of a furiously 
proselytizing rationalism and of an obsessively centralizing claim to unity.”37
The predicament of state definition of acceptable religious practice: the French-
Algerian mirror
To the extent that the 2006 Ordinance is so closely related to the state’s project 
of containing societal and national dislocation, it is comparable to the 2004 
French law banning religious signs from schools. The argumentation of the 
Stasi Commission,38 whose recommendation led to the passing of the March 
2004 law, was equally oriented toward the defense of public order. Akin to the 
Algerian case, wherein the state presents itself as the protector of credulous 
and weak individuals, the French state justifies its ban of religious signs as a 
35) Ghania Qamraoui, “Ghoulamallah s’indigne des propos de Bader: La règlementation
du culte relève des prérogatives de l’état!” Echorouk Online, February 12, 2010, http://www 
.echoroukonline.com/fra/index.php?news = 5799.
36) François Burgat, L’Islamisme en face (Paris: La Découverte, 1996),
37) James McDougall, History and Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 110.
38) Named after its president, Bernard Stasi.
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way to protect young Muslim women from the pressure of militant minori-
ties. In both cases, the states’ demand for a clear definition of religion opens 
up the complex question of how to determine acceptable religious practice. 
Importantly, the French ban concerns all religious signs, whereas the Algerian 
Ordinance specifically targets “non Islamic religions.” Despite this major dif-
ference, however, the similarity of the rationale on which the two legislations 
are based is striking. This resemblance is partly explained by the strong influ-
ence of the French model of the nation state on Algerian post-independence 
institutions and constitutional history.39 It suggests that the issue of religious 
freedom in Algeria, as in France, should be apprehended from the perspective 
of the state-society competition over the meanings of the nation, rather than 
from an essentialist assumption about the supposed impossibility of religious 
plurality in Muslim contexts.
According to article 7 of the 2006 law in Algeria, religious practice has to be 
collective in order to be accepted as legal. Similarly, the French law of 2004 
stipulates that a religious sign must be defined as non-ostensible in order to be 
accepted as legal. But according to what standard can one define a practice as 
collective or a sign as non-ostensible? According to the 1991 Algerian Code of 
Association, to which article 7 of the 2006 Ordinance refers, an association 
requires 15 people to be legal.40 Does this consequently imply that for 
Christians’ religious practice to be considered collective, and therefore legal, it 
must be systematically organized around at least 15 people? What if someone 
invites nine people to her house to discuss religious texts? Does this constitute 
an illegal gathering in violation of the state’s definition of religious practice as 
a collective practice?41 Likewise, article 11.1 of the 2006 Ordinance opens up 
39) See K. Mameri, Les Constitutions algériennes. Histoire. Textes. Réflexions (Alger: Thala Editions, 
2008); and Mohammed Abdelwahab Bekhechi, “Remarques sur l’évolution du droit constitu-
tionnel algérien de l’indépendance à la révision constitutionnelle de 1996” (paper presented at a 
conference organized by the Center for the Study of Law in the Arab World, Saint Joseph 
University, Beirut, 1998), http://www.cedroma.usj.edu.lb/
files/constpaysarabes.htm.
40) Law 90-31 (December 4, 1990) regarding associations. http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/codes 
.htm
41) Lawyers defending Christian converts have further developed this argument, notably 
Kheloudja Khalfoun. See for an example of analyses of this type, the detailed analysis made by a 
group of Algerian lawyers of the 2006 ordinance: Advocacy group for non Muslim believers (Le 
collectif de défense des croyants autres que musulmans): http://collectifalgerie.free.fr/fr/?page_
id = 7, April 20, 2006.
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the question of how to measure the “means of seduction” capable of unsettling 
Muslims’ faith. Although the law suggests that authorized religious practice 
should be limited to the weekly ritual taking place in identifiable buildings, 
opponents of the law explain that religious practice does not solely consist of 
the ritual, but includes various educational, charity and welfare activities. 
Activities taking place beyond the walls of the religious building are not as 
easily readable and controllable by the state, and therefore can appear as 
potential instruments of division. In other words, the distinction between 
legal and illegal religious practice is based on standards that do not fully satisfy 
the ways in which Algerian Christian believers themselves define religious 
practice.
The Stasi Commission’s recommendations regarding the banning of osten-
sible religious signs sparked similar debates about how to define a religious 
sign as acceptable to the standards of a liberal public sphere. While the Muslim 
headscarf, the Jewish kippa, and “large” Christian crosses were deemed osten-
sible, more discreet signs, such as small necklaces representing a Quran, a cross 
or a Star of David, were deemed acceptable signs. This distinction, however, 
was widely criticized by believers of all faiths as artificial and arbitrary. The 
2004 French law and the 2006 Algerian Ordinance are both based on the 
assumption that faith is constructed through mundane and material means. 
Religious creed is thought to be something that can be readily constructed or 
unsettled by Evangelical or Muslim radicals, and therefore must be protected 
by the state. Such a view conflicts with both the Algerian Christians’ and 
French Muslims’ argument that faith is the result of God’s grace, and not of 
the more mundane means of seduction, coercion, or protection.
Conversion as statelessness
Even though the Algerian state insists on the necessity to make the religious 
practice of Christian converts legible, or in other words compatible with its 
monitoring policy, the way in which converts themselves define conversion 
and religion suggests, by contrast, a non-oppositional practice aimed at 
avoiding state control while actively committing to a new set of rules. This 
particular relation to the state may be described as a form of statelessness, one 
that, far from being merely a negative practice of escape, is oriented towards 
the formation of a new ideal of Algerian Christian citizenship.
Statelessness is the term political ethnographer James Scott uses to describe 
the new ways of life that were historically developed by uphill populations of 
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Southwest China and Northwest India in order to keep state power at bay.42 
The present discussion therefore borrows this notion of statelessness in order 
to underline the complex and dynamic state-society relation that informs 
Christians’ practice; however, the term is conceptualized somewhat differently 
than Scott’s perspective.
In The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott describes how the “remote hill peo-
ple” of “Zomia” resorted to various cultural, economical and political strate-
gies in order to escape the state project of bringing non-state space and people 
to heel—most notably through taxation and the imposition of specific forms 
of economical growth.43 Two key features characterize the efforts made by the 
stateless people of Zomia to escape fiscally legible economy: a deliberate choice 
of autonomy and cultural mobility. Although populations that have placed 
themselves at the state periphery have often been called barbarian or uncivi-
lized, Scott shows that their effort to resist the state enclosure movement is 
deliberate and intentional. People of Zomia have chosen their location and 
way of life to maintain their autonomy vis-à-vis the state. The hill population 
has developed forms of escape agriculture and escape social structure “designed 
to aid dispersal and autonomy and to ward off political subordination.”44 In 
addition to the purposefulness of state resistance, fluidity is another central 
distinctive feature of the life of Zomians. Versatility has become a decisive 
aspect of a strategy of state evasion and of adaptation to changing constella-
tions of power. “Zomians are not as a rule only linguistically and ethnically 
amphibious; they are … capable of nearly instantaneous social change, aban-
doning their fields and house to join or form a new community at the behest 
of a trusted prophet. Their capacity to ‘turn on a dime’ represents the ultimate 
in escape social structure.”45 Despite the fact that stateless people’s pri-
mary objective is to escape state taxation and control, they do not show any 
interest in the formation of alternative national structures. In the case of 
Zomia, the “justification for designating the area has nothing to do with 
national boundaries or strategic conceptions but is rather based on certain 
ecological regularities and structural relationships that do not hesitate to cross 
national frontiers.”46
42) The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010).
43) Ibid., 16.
44) Ibid., 23 (emphasis mine).
45) Ibid., 24.
46) Ibid., 26.
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In the context of conversion among Algerians, I use the term “statelessness” 
to describe a practice oriented toward the search for new moral rules and a 
new national identify in addition to evading the state’s attempt to confiscate 
religious, cultural, and national symbols. Despite the different way in which it 
is used here, “statelessness” is nevertheless appropriate insofar as it captures a 
relational practice of state evasion that goes beyond conventional boundaries 
between politics and culture. As in the case of Zomia, statelessness is not 
reducible to a partisan form of political opposition or to a social movement. 
Its distinguishing aspect stems from the fact that it is inseparably a cultural, 
economical, and political form of action.
The present use of the term “statelessness” differs in three important respects 
from what it describes in relation to the life of Zomians. While Scott insists on 
a project of escape and a deliberate choice made by uphill people for political 
and cultural autonomy, this study focuses on Algerian converts’ preoccupation 
with new forms of moral and collective rules. In other words, statelessness here 
is not so much the result of an intentional plan of state evasion as the conse-
quence of a moral project of reconstruction of the self and the nation. Indeed, 
Scott acknowledges that the anarchy sought for by Zomians does not equate 
with anomy or absence of political order, as he extensively describes the new 
forms of order established in the hills. Nonetheless, he does emphasize the 
versatility of these orders and the reversibility of rules: Zomians resist the state 
enclosure because of their ability to “turn on a dime.” By contrast, the com-
mitment to rules and the effort to make obedience to these rules a durable part 
of everyday life are central aspects of Algerian converts’ practice.
Whereas Scott focuses on the rejection of state rules, I am more interested 
in Christians’ attempt to imagine new moral and collective rules. What is at 
stake in Algerian conversions is, rather than the effort not to be governed, the 
question of how not to be governed like that (i.e., in the name of the FLN 
inspired Arabo-Islamic narrative of the Algerian nation, and by means of the 
state procedures of legibilisation of all religious and cultural practice). 
Statelessness is herein understood less as a practice of anarchy than as a form 
of moral critique and reflexive intractability.
Importantly, this definition of Algerian converts’ Christianity as stateless-
ness is not a functionalist reduction of their religious experience. It is not 
argued that converts decide to believe in Jesus in order to challenge state rule. 
Algerians do not convert to Christianity in order to resist the state; rather, they 
develop new understandings of their relation to the state and the nation 
through the new understandings of faith and freedom that they cultivate. 
This relation is different from the deliberate and ideological type of state 
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opposition that Islamist social movements such as FIS advocated in the 
1990s.47 Contrary to Islamist movements of the 1990s, Algerian Christians do 
not rely on a predefined set of ideological guidelines or theological canon in 
order to rationalize their relation to the state.48 Instead, the definition of this 
relation emerges from various forms of practices and discussions—ranging 
from learning the sincere form of prayer, attending Bible schools and Saturday 
sermons, to everyday interaction with neighbors and family. Primarily directed 
toward enabling converts to develop new understandings of themselves as sin-
cere believers (free of their former superstitions and fears), these practices also 
enable them to develop new discourse regarding not only their right to hold 
and practice different religious beliefs, but also to spread these beliefs in the 
interest of the broader society and, ultimately, of the “sinful” state.
Contrary to what has been documented in other contexts, no clear pattern 
emerges from converts’ biographies suggesting that conversion primarily 
offers a way out of drugs, alcohol, or poverty.49 Likewise, when explaining the 
path that led them from Islam or atheism to Evangelicalism, none of my 
47) With regards to the strategy of the Islamic Salvation Front and its relation to the state and 
nationalism, see Hugh Roberts, “Algeria between Eradicators and Conciliators,” Middle East 
Report 189 (July-August 1994): 24-27; Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria: Studies in a Broken 
Polity (London: Verso, 2003); Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); James McDougall, History and the Culture of 
Nationalism in Algeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); François Burgat and 
William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin: University of Texas at Austin, 
1993); Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998 (London: Hurst and Co., 2000); and 
Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (Reading, Berkshire: Ithaca 
Press, 1996).
48) Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam (Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press, 2008); Sebastian J. Walsh, “Killing Post-Almohad Man: Malek Bennabi, Algerian Islamism 
and the Search for a Liberal Governance,” The Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 2 (2007): 
235-54; Allan Christelow, “Ritual, Culture and Politics of Islamic Reformism in Algeria,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 23, no. 3 (1987): 255-73; and Andrew March, “The Uses of Fitra (Human 
Nature) in the Legal and Political Theory of ‘Allal al-Fasī: Natural Law or ‘Taking People as They 
Are’?” (working paper, Faculty of Law, Yale University, New Heaven, Connecticut, November 4, 
2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 1500009.
49) Most of the scholarship pertaining to conversions that focuses on the instrumentality of 
conversion as a means to escape a material situation of discomfort, or to resist a cultural context 
adverse to women’s empowerment, also recognizes that the instrumentality of conversion 
does not exhaust the integrality of belief or preclude the possibility of sincerity. See Elizabeth 
Brusco, The Reformation of Machismo (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995); and Andrew R. 
Chesnut, Born Again in Brazil: The Pentecostal Boom and the Pathogens of Poverty (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1997).
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informants explicitly mentioned a specific intent to mobilize against the state. 
Although converts do not use the term statelessness in order to account for 
their practice, their description of their spiritual path always includes com-
ments both about their moral needs and their relation to the broader society 
and the state. To that extent, the term is not a retrospective rationalization of 
their practice, but rather an attempt to grasp their own understanding of a 
practice that they relate to the moral reconstruction of their soul and of the 
nation-state.
Arguing that the act of converting essentially fulfills a religious objective is 
still a manner of acknowledging an instrumental dimension to converts’ prac-
tice. However, it is important to refrain from rejecting any reference to inten-
tionality as evidence of a raw functionalist interpretation. The fact that 
Algerian converts decide to believe in Jesus in order to respond to spiritual 
(and sometimes material) dissatisfaction does not mean that Evangelical 
Christianity is understood here as a new form of false consciousness or “opiate 
of the masses.”50 The approach to intentionality that informs my understand-
ing of Algerian converts’ practice draws upon studies of conversions that seek 
to move beyond the binary opposition between reason and revelation, or reli-
gion and politics. For example, in his study of conversions to Pentecostalism 
in Venezuela, David Smilde shows that although converts do decide to believe 
in order to respond to material issues of violence or substance abuse, the 
instrumental aspect of their practice does not make their practice less sustain-
able, valuable, nor less religious. The notion of “imaginative rationality” he 
refers to in order to describe Venezuelan converts’ intentionality “should not 
be taken here as a synonym for false, insincere or ungrounded.”51 Rather, the 
concept designates the “human’s ability to get things done by creating con-
cepts.”52 Similarly, the term “statelessness,” while granting an instrumental 
aspect to converts’ practice, does not refer to a purely reactive or negative 
escape, but to the process of creating new rulings for the self and new ideals 
for the nation.
This understanding of instrumentality is closely tied to a pragmatist concep-
tion of religion as a contextual and practical accomplishment rather than as a 
predefined normative order. From this point of view, religious activity, just 
as any form of activity, is oriented towards the achievement of certain goals. 
50) Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843), 1.
51) David Smilde, Reason to Believe: Cultural Agency in Latin American Evangelicalism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), 13.
52) Ibid.
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Yet these goals, the meanings that are assigned to them, and the manner in 
which they are achieved are not defined ex ante. This approach calls into ques-
tion the relevance of a normative discussion regarding the opposition between 
faith and instrumentality, or between religion and politics. In the worldview 
of Evangelical Pentecostalism as it is taught to Algerians, pursuing mundane 
objectives such as the salvation of the nation is as much a religious goal as the 
salvation of the soul and obedience to a constraining ethical code. No action 
or discourse can be defined as instrumentally or politically independent from 
the context in which these meanings take shape. As demonstrated by David 
Smilde, “there is no universal distinction between appropriate and inappropri-
ate goals of religious practice. These distinctions are located in concrete his-
torical, biographical, and even interactive contexts. For believers, the success 
of religious concepts in foretelling consequences is what validates them.”53 
Although Algerian Christians do not convert in order to resist the state, the 
anti-state intention and nationalist orientation of their practice does not ren-
der their religious experience less authentic. Their search for religious rulings 
and their reflection on Christians’ position in Algerian polity are inseparable 
and are not lived as mutually exclusive or contradictory. Both the call to self-
purification and to national salvation helps them to respond to situations of 
unease as individuals and as citizens. Their main concern is not whether their 
activity can be described as religious or political, but locally accomplished 
relevance.
Salvation versus religion (din)
Converts come from different social and professional backgrounds and their 
previous engagement with Islam is often extremely varied. Some converts are 
former Sufi marabous or imams who, in some cases, may have endorsed radi-
cal and violent forms of Islamic practice during the Black Decade. Others 
describe their pre-conversion experience as one of agnosticism, nominal 
adherence to Islam, or even atheism.
An important common feature that emerges from converts’ narratives is 
their insistence on rejecting the very notion of “religion” as din. When asked 
them about their motivations for converting to the Christian “religion,” my 
interlocutors repeatedly insisted on the fact that what they had converted to 
could not be adequately defined as a religion. Instead of the term “religion,” 
Algerian Christians preferred using phrases such as “faith,” “grace,” “freedom,” 
53) Ibid., 53.
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“love,” or, most of the time, “fellowship of Jesus.” For example, when I asked 
about her new “religion,” Z.—a schoolteacher in her mid-thirties—inter-
rupted the question and said: “This is not a religion (laisa din), but a Christian 
freedom, a freedom in Jesus (hourriyya fi yasu al-masih). I did not choose God, 
but God freed me. I did not choose a religion, I chose Jesus. He gave me the 
true life (a‘tani al-hayat al-abadiyya). He is the path, the truth and the life (Ina 
houa tariq w’al-haq w’al-hayat).”
Similarly, when asked about which denomination of Protestant Christianity 
they identified with, converts strongly rejected the need to identify with a 
particular doctrinal trend. I.—a former Sufi in her late fifties, a cancer survi-
vor, a daughter of a Sufi sheikh and sister of a former radical Imam—thus 
argued: “We are not evangelical or Pentecostal. We are Christian. We are the 
body of Christ. This is not a religion, but a path with God, freedom and love, 
I am a new born.” Mustapha Krim—the leader of the Protestant Church of 
Algiers— likewise insisted on the irrelevance of denominational divisions to 
describe Algerian Christianity: “We are free of these divisions, we live our faith 
in a very down-to-earth way (au ras des pâquerettes).”54 When questioned as to 
the reason why religion was seen as such an inadequate term to describe their 
own practice, the interviewees all insisted on two key aspects of religion as din: 
namely, its legal and constraining aspect and its artificiality. K.— who has 
converted more than twenty years ago in a Methodist church and is now 
leader of a small church in Oran—explained what he meant by religion in the 
following terms:
Religion is clothes, something exterior, it is an obligation. Religion, Islam or Catholicism, 
it’s all the same: it’s a disguise. True Christianity on the other hand, means that you have 
your heart in Jesus. Christianity is a path with God. When you live with God, you carry the 
cross. You accept and you forgive. You do good, you forgive the enemy. I decide when I 
want to pray. It is not a debt. It is not an obligation. Christianity, it’s not a debt that you 
pay. It’s a choice. Religion obliges you to wake up at 5 A.M.; you pay your debt. I don’t have 
any debt to pay. All my debts have been paid. This is my decision, my choice. Christianity 
is herein defined as a sincere faith and free practice, in opposition to religion as din.
Importantly, Islam and Catholicism are rejected for similar reasons. In other 
words, Algerian Christians convert not so much from Islam in particular as 
54) Protestant Missions in Algeria have historically been largely inter-denominational, even when 
they officially identified with a particular denomination. The North Africa Mission was largely 
interdenominational, and even the Methodist Mission was composed of missionaries from dif-
ferent denominations. See Heggoy, Fifty Years of Evangelical Missionary Movement, 201-210.
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from religion in general, defined as both constraining law and a disguise. 
Z. emphasized the insincerity of her religious practice when she was a Muslim: 
“In Islam, there were prayers, but no feelings. In Christ, I felt that prayer was 
a spiritual prayer (salat rouhiyya) and not simply a physical prayer (jasadiyya). 
In Christianity, I feel that God is in my soul. When we pray, it is a complete 
demand and not in Islam. Ritual (’ibadat) in Christianity is more true. I pray 
all the time. Fasting is my freedom. I fast when I want.” Her thoughts about 
praying and fasting echo a comment made by another convert, who described 
Ramadan as “the month when everyone hides to eat,” thereby underlining the 
more significant truthfulness and sincerity of Christianity. S.—the leader of a 
Church in Kabylia—explained the difference between Christianity and Islam 
as the difference between a religion of life and love and one of laws and 
constraints:
Islam is based on law of the Old Testament in order to impose on men a burden (joug) that 
they cannot tolerate. Jesus is the God of life and love, he is the path, the truth and life. I do 
not want a God that only talks about death and war. Jesus’ death is enough. That is the only 
sacrifice that god accepts. Redemption and salvation are possible because of the one who 
gave his life instead of us/for us (à notre place).
In this quote, what S. rejects in Islam is its legalist, obligatory, and exclusive 
dimension (death and war), which he contrasts with the notions of redemp-
tion and love. The converts’ rationalization of their own experience is thus 
consistently oriented toward the rejection of religion as intolerable laws and 
disguise, rather than toward the rejection of Islam per se.
Specifically, it is the legalist and artificial aspects of religion that are 
repeatedly associated with the state’s intervention in religious affairs. The 
rejection of state intervention in religious affairs may explain why Sufism, 
even though somewhat comparable to Evangelical Christianity with its focus 
on piety and self-empowerment, is often rejected by Algerian Christians 
(many of whom are former Sufis). Indeed, in recent years, the state has imple-
mented a policy of “retraditionalizing” Islam as a way to constrain the appeal 
of Salafism. However, the public largely understands the state’s participation 
in the rebirth of some Sufi zawiyas as a political strategy employed by govern-
ment officials to gain votes, and has contributed to the decline of Sufism’s 
appeal.55
55) Mohammed Hachemaoui, “Y a-t-il de la Baraka dans l’urne ? L’invention de la Tradition dans 
le Touat-Gourara” (paper presented at AIMS conference, Oran, June 26, 2010).
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In my conversations with them, converts regularly emphasized how the 
state’s use of Islam as the cement of the postcolonial nation-state had led to the 
ossification and, ultimately, the death of Islam. “[The] State’s control on reli-
gion,” one convert argued, “is the death of religion.” This rejection of religion 
as law, understood as state law, applies to all forms of contemporary Islamic 
practice in Algeria. Salafism, Sufism and Islamism are all described by converts 
as being corrupted and delegitimated by the state’s attempt to shape religious 
practice. By contrast, Protestant Christianity provides converts with a new 
understanding of freedom that is not conditioned by the nation state’s defini-
tion of acceptable religious practice. Instead, this freedom is based on the 
cultivation of a sincere form of piety through prayers, attendance at services 
and Bible schools, everyday interaction with neighbors and work.
An important feature of converts’ rejection of din’s artificiality and legalism 
is the extent to which they correlate the sincerity of their new faith to a “moral 
narrative of modernity.”56 Most of my informants insisted on the “backward-
ness” of legalistic Islamic practice. When discussing their pre-conversion expe-
rience or the religion of the broader society, they put forth various comments, 
ranging from outward Islamophobic accusations about the Prophet morality 
to more nuanced analyzes about religious experiences. Despite these differ-
ences, all comments converged toward a similar critique of a fetish-like, ritu-
alistic, and almost pagan form of Islamic practice. The ritual of Ramadan, the 
codified organization of prayer, or the common use of the expression 
“Insha’Allah” were commonly derided as evidence of a superstitious, fearful, 
passive, and childish relation to God. These features were associated with the 
immobilization and corruption of state institutions and their grip over 
Algerian citizens. In this narrative, where the notion of “help yourself ” is thus 
opposed to the supposedly fatalistic “Insha’Allah,” the free, interiorized and 
sincere prayer is preferred to the ritualized salat. It is implied that conversion 
to Evangelical Christianity paves the way to a more modern and active form 
of agency and citizenship. The contempt of Algerian converts for their former 
life and the religion of broader society is based on a critique that is very similar 
to the one formulated by Dutch missionaries in Indonesia, which Webb Keane 
describes in the following words: “Submitting to fixed discursive forms is not 
only a theological error or an affront to God; it threatens to undermine the 
agency proper to humans.”57 Conversion to Evangelical Christianity in Algeria 
56) Webb Keane, Christian Moderns, Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), 47 sq.
57) Ibid., 2
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engenders a similar moral narrative of modernity, whereby progress is not just 
about technology, but also about self-mastery and human emancipation. In 
the particular context of Algeria, access to modern agency supposes purifica-
tion from materiality, herein understood as the materiality of a legalistic, ritu-
alistic, and codified practice.
Converts’ insistence on constructing a sincere and truly pious self is gener-
ally consistent with the discourse of Evangelical born again Christians in con-
texts very different from that of Algeria.58 It also echoes the ways in which 
da’wa Salafi movements describe their own practice. Both groups focus on the 
transformation of the individual into a pious and sincere self through specific 
pedagogical and social means and through participation in faith communities 
that emphasize the search for purity, as opposed to the blind imitation of local 
folk customs.59 The practices of both groups are informed by a critique of the 
state’s attempt to monitor religious activities and by an effort to reach out to 
the broader public through da’wa or proselytizing. Both religious movements 
resort to indirect means of development—through charities and education—
rather than to frontal opposition to the state. Although an extensive compari-
son of Algerian Evangelical Christianity and these two religious trends exceeds 
the scope of this paper, it is important to identify a number of key features that 
specifically characterize the self and collective representations embodied by 
Algerian Christian lives.
Converts’ practice distinguishes itself in three important respects from Salafi 
projects. First, the performance of statelessness is not based on a simple shift 
toward the sphere of private morality, or a movement of individualization of 
religious practice.60 Rather, it is closely tied to the emergence of a millenarist 
form of discourse and a process of collective self-identification as a group that 
is at once persecuted by, and savior of, the Algerian state. Second, converts’ 
accounts of their conversion experiences are inseparable from an attempt to 
redefine the identity and the history of the Algerian nation, the “true” origin 
of which is to be found in Africa and Christianity, rather than in the Middle 
East and Islam. Despite the essential orientation of the discourse of da’wa 
Salafis toward the notion of a transnational Umma, in which the nation-state 
58) Sebastien Fath, ed., Le Protestantisme évangélique, un christianisme de conversion: Entre rup-
tures et filiations (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2004), entire doc
59) With regards to this critique, many Islamic piety movements have developed against the 
folklorization of religious practice, see Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 49 sq.
60) Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005).
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has lost all legitimacy, the reinvention of national tradition is a central aspect 
of Christian converts’ discourse in Algeria. Finally, Christian converts’ practice 
differs from the practices of da’wa Salafis inasmuch as the former account for 
their endeavors in terms of autobiography, while the latter primarily insist on 
the believer’s subscription and obedience to orthodox Islamic tradition.61 
Narratives of conversions are autofictional accounts through which the indi-
vidual recreates herself as a newborn. In this effort, her sole guide is the exam-
ple of Jesus, an example to which Algerian Christians refer more as a source of 
inspiration than as a model whose attitude should be imitated. By contrast, in 
Salafism, individual piety and social practice are essentially oriented toward 
the enactment of orthopraxy and what is defined as the authentic and ortho-
dox Islamic tradition, as well as toward the imitation of the pious companions 
of the prophet (salaf).
Algerian Christian millenarism
Although the paradigm of “law versus faith” is central to the narrative of most 
converts, this opposition cannot in and of itself shed light on the nature of 
Algerians’ post-conversion relation to Islam and to the broader society. Indeed, 
the critique of the legalist and ossified aspect of religion is a key aspect of the 
success of Salafi piety movements.
However, taking converts’ description of Islam at face value calls for a cri-
tique similar to the one developed by E.P. Sanders’ historical reconstruction of 
the Judaism of Paul’s time.62 Sanders and his followers have convincingly dem-
onstrated that Paul’s account of the Judaism of his time is inaccurate, to the 
extent that it was actually not legalistic. Similarly, the rationalization of con-
version as a mere rejection of din as law does not correspond to the reality and 
diversity of Islamic practice. The discrepancy between Christians’ description 
of Algerian Islam and the reality of this religious landscape does not make the 
61) Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Occasional Papers Series, Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University (March 1986), http://ccas.georgetown.
edu/research/papers/, 9-24.
62) Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977); Paul, the Law and the 
Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); and Steven Westerholm, “The ‘New Perspec-
tive’ at Twenty-Five,” in Justification and Variegated Nomism, vol. 2, The Paradoxes of Paul, 
eds. D.A. Carson, Peter T. O’Brien, and Mark A. Seifrid (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2004), 1-38, quoted in Joel Robbins, “Anthropology, Pentecostalism, and the New Paul: 
Conversion, Event, and Social Transformation,” in South Atlantic Quarterly 109, no. 4 (2010): 
636-38.
96 N. Marzouki / Middle East Law and Governance 4 (2012) 69–105 
“law versus faith” narrative to which Christians resort less true or effective in 
their own experience. But it does suggest that, in Christians’ post-conversion 
relation to their past and to Algerian society, there is something beyond the 
pure quest of sincere faith and individual salvation. The correlation between 
the salvation of the self and of the nation is, even more so than the simple 
opposition to din as law, a distinctive feature of Algerian Christians’ religious 
practice—a feature that also marks its clear distinction from Islamic piety 
movements.
Converts’ insistence on their belonging to “Corpus Christi” rather than to 
the Algerian state expresses the extent to which they view conversion as a lib-
eration from state control. S. for example, explained his conversion in these 
terms: “It is very difficult to free oneself from the burden (fardeau) of 
Algerianity. I am related to Christ, rather than to Algeria. This experience has 
allowed me to uproot myself from Algerianity. [The] link to Christ is stronger 
in my life than the link to Algeria.” But even if most Algerian Christians insist, 
like S., on their desire to free themselves from the pressure of an intrusive 
state, conversion cannot be reduced to a spiritual form of exile, or haraga. 
Weekly religious services are a key element of a convert’s individual path 
toward Christianity; yet, they also play a major role in the process through 
which converts collectively define their identity as a group, as well as their rela-
tion to the state and to society in general. During religious services in which I 
participated, the pastors’ sermons defined the relationship between converts 
(as a group) and the state. This relationship was neither antagonistic nor did it 
suggest a mere retreat from the public sphere into the realm of private piety or 
toward a global Christianity. Rather, this relation emerges as an ambiguous 
one simultaneously based on a process of self-identification and on a shared 
representation of the community’s moral superiority over the persecuting 
state. The community’s interest in self-marginalization is reinforced by its cer-
titude that Algerian converts will one day be called to save the Algerian state. 
This idea is supported by the pastors’ repeated calls for their congregations to 
acquire specific forms of emotional dispositions such as love, forgiveness, and 
joy, all of which are considered to be marks of the converts’ moral superiority. 
If conversion as statelessness entails a separation from the state, it is not 
through confrontational opposition, but through the converts’ enthusiastic 
confidence that, one day, they may be called to save Algeria from itself.
Most of these religious services began with the pastor calling the audience 
to bless their relatives and friends—converted or not—and, surprisingly, to 
bless the State, the country, or even the police. One may first assume that these 
statements are merely a rhetorical strategy that allows converts to answer to 
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the perceived threat of state surveillance. Through these unexpected blessings, 
converts reassure state informants, potentially present in the audience, about 
their allegiance to Algerian authorities. However, closer examination of the 
way in which state authority is referenced during religious services suggests 
that something more complex than a simple strategy of deception is at work. 
In December 2009, I attended a religious service in a church of Kabylia that 
is a particularly instructive example of the complex way in which converts 
envision their relation to the state. That day, a special guest from the 
Netherlands, Sir G., took part in the service. After a two hour service led by 
the Kabyle pastor of the church, Sir G. came to the pulpit and addressed the 
audience in English while the pastor’s wife translating his words into French, 
Kabyle and Arabic. “They tell you that you are committing blasphemy,” he 
started, “but I am here to tell you that they are the ones who are committing 
blasphemy.” Sir G. then engaged in a detailed comment on Chapters 6 and 7 
of the Book of Acts. He strongly emphasized the story of Stephen returning 
the accusation against the Sanhedrin, blaming them for their lack of love and 
devotion.
After finishing his comment on Stephen’s persecution and Saul’s participa-
tion in the stoning and persecution of the Church, Sir G. produced his 
European Union passport from his pocket, and raised his arm to show the 
passport to the entire audience: “This shows my attachment to my country, 
but we all hope to have a passport to heaven.…. You are a minority, but you 
are not alone.” Sir G. went on to describe the persecution of Christians in 
North Korea and Colombia to convey to his audience that Algerian Christians’ 
suffering is comparatively benign, and that they are part of a global commu-
nity, part of the “body of Christ.” In the conclusion of his speech, Sir G. 
shifted toward a more exulting and conquering tone. He referred once again 
to the story of Paul’s conversion and asked: “What if one day, Saul comes to 
Jesus’ door and says: ‘I am not Saul any more, but Paul, and I am here to lead 
you’?” (emphasis added).
Sir G.’s sermon aimed at providing his audience with arguments that would 
enable them to refute two major misperceptions of Christianity in Algeria—
namely, the idea that converts are primarily motivated by their hopes of 
obtaining a visa for a Western country, and the notion that Christianity is 
blasphemous. Sir G.’s sermon was not simply meant to communicate an edifi-
catory story that would move or comfort his audience. Instead, it displayed 
arguments to the audience that they could use in the debates sparked by their 
religious choice. Importantly, the sermon was not only aimed at the present 
audience, but was oriented both by and toward an imaginary audience of 
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Christianity’s detractors (“they tell you…/but I am here to tell you…”). The 
sermon represents a key element in the definition of converts’ identity as a 
group that is distinct from, and accountable to, the broader society and the 
state.
In order to counter the argument that converts’ attraction to Christianity is 
solely predicated on the desire to receive a visa to a Western country, Sir 
G. emphasized Algerian Christians’ place within a Global Christianity, and 
insisted that heaven, and not the West, constitutes their true goal. Interestingly, 
he compared the condition of Algerian Christians to two examples from the 
non-Western world (Colombia and North Korea), carefully avoiding any 
comparison with Western Christians. Regarding the accusation of blasphemy, 
Sir G. taught his audience how to rebut the charge of which they are accused 
through the exemplary story of Stephen’s martyrdom and Saul’s conversion. 
The insistence on Christians’ preference of heaven over the West and the story 
of Stephen’s response to his judges both reinforce the idea of a group that is 
morally superior to the State.
The relationship between Christians and the state that was constructed 
throughout this sermon is more complex than one of mere opposition or 
retreat. The story of Stephen and Saul suggests that, even though converts are 
now persecuted and accused of blasphemy, they may one day be called to 
engage in a similar exercise of “fraternal correction” of the state. This shift 
from an individual to a collective eschatology, and the tight link that is estab-
lished between the purification of the soul and the salvation of the nation is 
indeed a common feature of the discourse of Evangelical Christianity world-
wide. 63 Such tropes are circulated and have become popular among Algerian 
Christians through various channels such as the Internet, Arab Christian TV 
channels, and contacts with Evangelical pastors based in Europe.64 However, 
the idea of reverting persecution into election that so often characterizes the 
discourse of Evangelicalism also strongly resonates with the long Algerian tra-
dition of dream telling and millenarism.65
63) For example, it strongly echoes aspects of Peter Wagner’s “dominion theology.” Dominion! 
How Kingdom Action Can Change the World (Grand Rapids: Chose, 2008). Regarding the link 
between the circulation of Evangelical themes about national salvation and the purification of 
the soul in other contexts, see Gonzalez, “Reclaiming the (Swiss) nation for God,” 425-451.
64) Channels such as Channel North Africa play a major role in the circulation of information 
and transmission of Evangelical tropes throughout North Africa. For example, see http://www.
cna-sat.org/. I examine the role and impact of these Christian Media stations and the circulation 
of Evangelical themes in a forthcoming article.
65) On Algerian millenarism, see Julia Clancy-Smith, Rebel and Saint: Muslim notable, populist 
protest, colonial encounters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
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Africa versus the Middle East
The second specific feature of converts’ practices that distinguishes it from 
other comparable forms of religious practices is their insistence on redefining 
the true origins of the Algerian nation. Although Salafi movements may criti-
cize government officials’ role in the distortion or folklorization of “true” 
Islam, they refrain from harshly questioning the nationalist narrative that has 
become hegemonic since Algerian independence—a narrative that underlines 
the Arabo-Islamic identity of Algeria and the key role that Islamic reformism 
has played in Algerian independence.66 By contrast, reinventing the “true” 
tradition of Algeria is an integral part of converts’ discourse about their reli-
gious practice. Citing Augustine, Tertullian, the role of pre-Islamic Christianity, 
and the African roots of Algeria is a common trope of Christian Algerians’ 
discourse. Anything related to the Middle East, especially to Egypt or Saudi 
Arabia, is rejected as foreign.
Language is one of the main sites of converts’ contestation of the Arabo-
Islamic narrative of the nation. Most religious services in which I participated 
took place in three languages: Arabic, Kabyle and French. In certain churches, 
trilingualism is almost officially established. When a song is sung in Kabyle, 
for example, TV screens transmit the translation of the song in Arabic and 
French. Sermons are frequently translated into at least one of the two other 
languages, and churchgoers use Bibles in both Kabyle and Arabic. In other 
churches, trilingualism takes place in a more informal manner, depending on 
the changing composition of the audience of the day. In conversations about 
the languages used during the religious services, the converts with whom 
I spoke repeatedly criticized the type of Arabic that is used in mosques, 
describing it as a language that is alien to Algeria. It is not that the language is 
criticized for being Arabic, but that it is a foreign, Middle-Eastern brand of 
Arabic, which is different from the language that the converts’ parents and 
grandparents used to speak. This critique of Middle-Eastern Arabic, as opposed 
to the genuinely Algerian Arabic dialect, parallels the converts’ critique of 
Islamism as distinct from an authentic and peaceful “Algerian Islam.” After the 
attack against Tafat Church on January 12, 2010, Mustapha Krim, the leader 
of the Eglise Protestante d’Algérie (EPA), gave an interview to El Watan 
(January 15, 2010) in which he insisted on the fact that Christians are not 
critical of Islam, but of the Arabo-Nasserist ideology that led to the distortion 
66) McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism.
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of Islam (i.e., to Islamism).67 Krim, like most of the converts that I inter-
viewed, speaks very respectfully of the “Islam of our parents,” but vehemently 
rejects Egyptian and Middle-Eastern brands of Islamism. “[The] Islam of our 
parents is absolutely not comparable to today’s political Islam.… We are fully 
citizens, as much as all other Algerians.” Just as state officials and Islamists 
argue that Christian converts are manipulated by Western powers, Christian 
converts similarly argue that the Algerian state and Algerian Islamists are 
manipulated by Middle-Eastern powers.
Beyond the specific issue of language, Algeria’s identity itself is reconstructed 
as either a specifically Maghrebi one, or as an African one. The appropriation 
of the fierce debate that agitated the Algerian public in December 2009 after 
the Algerian soccer team was assaulted in Egypt clearly illustrates this practice. 
During this period, newspapers across the ideological spectrum, from Islamist 
to secularist, published articles daily to condemn Egypt’s behavior, and to 
question the privileged relationship between Egypt and Algeria. Although the 
events were interpreted in different ways, a clear consensus emerged regarding 
the notion that Egypt’s behavior was unacceptable: how could a brother 
Islamic country treat Algeria in such a way? On December 4, 2009, during a 
Friday service in Oran, the pastor began his sermon by inviting his audience 
to dismiss the insults made by all the “Pharaohs” of the world. He then went 
on to read Exodus 14: 30-31,68  and explained that this was a good metaphor 
for what had happened to the Algerian soccer players in Egypt, in addition to 
the manner in which Christians were treated by Muslims in Algeria. God had 
protected Algerians against the Egyptian “Pharaohs” by giving them victory in 
Sudan, an “African country,” rather than in Egypt. In the pastor’s interpreta-
tion of the conflict between the Egyptian and Algerian soccer teams, Egypt 
represented at once the Middle-Eastern arrogant country that bullied its 
North African “brother” country, and, on a more abstract level, Algerian 
Muslims who oppressed their Christian fellow citizens. In the pastor’s narra-
tive, Algerian Christians are emotionally related to Africa, not to the Middle 
East. Therefore, it was God’s will that the Algerian team lost in Egypt “so that 
Algerians can be saved from lynching and so that they were given a chance to 
win the game in Sudan, a little insignificant African country.”
67) In this interview, Krim stated: “Que la constitution algérienne qui garantit la liberté de culte 
soit appliquée sur le terrain.”
68) These two verses conclude the passage describing how God allowed Israelites to cross the sea 
and escape Egypt, while the Egyptian Pharaoh and army were drawn in the sea.
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The pastor’s sermon was oriented toward two types of audiences, and car-
ried out two different repertoires of identification for converts. When he 
addressed an imagined Egyptian audience, the pastor suggested that Algerian 
Christians side with the wider Algerian society. When he addressed an imag-
ined Muslim audience, however, he referred to a conflicted relationship 
between Algerian Christians and Algerian Muslims. In either case, this sermon 
clearly shows how the discursive practice of Algerian Christians is strongly 
informed by the events of the context in which their religious services take 
place. That is, the way in which Christians define their individual and collec-
tive identity does not take place in isolation from, or in mere opposition to, 
the debates of the broader society. Christians’ questioning of the African or 
Arab identity of Algeria, as well as their critique of Middle Eastern imperial-
ism and fake solidarity, are concerns that are widely shared by the rest of soci-
ety. For example, in an article entitled “Let’s Ban the Use of the word 
‘brothers’,” movie director Mohamed Lakhdar-Hamina wrote: “To the 
Egyptian television and to their leaders who call us ‘barbarians,’ I say that … 
I am proud of being Berbère. From now on, let’s stop calling each other 
‘brothers’.”69
Through its engagement in controversies about the nature of Algerian 
nationalism, the religious practice of Algerian Christians differs from the 
global orientation of Evangelicalism and Salafism, and responds to concerns 
that belong to wider Algerian society. The discursive strategy of drawing a 
boundary between good, moderate Islam and Islamism is by no means proper 
to Christian converts. This reasoning is the basis of argumentation of numer-
ous mosque rectors in France, such as Soheib Bencheikh, who has consistently 
supported Algerian Christians’ rights. Ironically, it is even consistent with the 
Algerian state’s policy of neutralizing Islamism while revivifying Sufi Tariqas as 
archetypes of moderate Islam.70 In other words, converts’ efforts to redefine 
the true origin of Algeria as both African and Christian are not considered 
heretical in contemporary social debates. Rather, they echo the inclination of 
Algerian society to question the Arabo-Nasserist narrative of nationalism. The 
convergence of converts’ discourse on national identity with comparable cri-
tiques of the FLN Arabo-Islamic nationalist narrative further shows that the 
phenomenon of conversion in Algeria is better understood from the perspec-
tive of changing state-society relations than in terms of a clash between Islam 
and Christianity. It also shows how converts’ arguments and beliefs are 
69) Mohamed Lakhdar Hamina, “Bannissons le mot ‘frères’,” El Watan, December 6, 2009.
70) Rachid Grim, “Le jeu politique des zaouias en Algérie,” El Watan, July 12, 2004.
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primarily informed by the context in which they are formed, and not by 
a supposedly fixed Christian view of Islam. Despite the description of 
Pentecostalism’s force as a “culture against culture,”71 Algerian converts’ 
engagement with debates about national identity, linguistic politics, and geo-
political categorization of their country, suggests that their practice involves 
principles and ideals that go beyond a mere rupture from national culture 
toward the abstract global community of Christ. More specifically, the imag-
ery on which their practice and discourse is based displays a significant interest 
in rewriting this national culture.
Conversion as auto-fiction
Christian converts share with Salafi da’wa movements a similar revivalist desire 
to break away from what is perceived as an inauthentic, folkloric or artificial 
form of religious practice, and to enact a more demanding and sincere form of 
piety. The two types of religious practices, however, differ in terms of the end 
toward which this revivalist shift is oriented. Salafi da’wa practice is oriented 
toward enacting what is defined as the true and authentic Islamic tradition. 
The renewal of faith and piety is based on the voluntary subscription of the 
believer to a specific discursive tradition.72 Narratives of Christian conver-
sions, by contrast, are primarily informed by the believer’s effort to reconstruct 
her life as a unique work of art. Christians describe conversion not so much as 
a pedagogical process focused on adherence to the Christian tradition, but as 
a miraculous moment that changed the life of the individual, a rewriting of 
their autobiography. Moreover, Salafi and Evangelical praxis are oriented 
towards the formation of different types of subjects. The model of piety pro-
posed by many Salafi movements is governed by the ideal of wholeness 
and incorporation; hence, the insistence on the notion of embodiment of 
religious dispositions, a feature that many anthropologists have captured by 
crafting terms such as Muslim “sensorum.”73 In this particular form of piety, 
the religious subject is defined by the ideal of a complete, spontaneous, 
and desired adhesion between religious norms and an individual’s behavior. 
By contrast, an Evangelical convert’s ideal or religious subject remains essen-
tially ambiguous and divided. This ambiguity is not merely a reflection of the 
71) K. Dombrowski, Against Culture: Development, Politics and Religion in Indian Alaska (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2001).
72) Mahmood, Polics of Piety; Charles Hirschkind, Ethical Soundscape: Cassettes Sermons and 
Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
73) Hirschkind, Ethical Soundscape, 98 sq.
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difficulty for newborn Christians to ignore their past and the broader society. 
It is to a large extent a necessary condition of maintaining their faith alive and 
enacting the sincerity of their conversion. Algerian Christians’ divided reli-
gious identity is apparent in their relation to their pre-conversion experience 
as well as in the way they answer to other Algerians’ perception.
A common theme of these narratives is how conversion helped the convert 
to radically change her lifestyle. In their stories, these believers consistently 
describe their life before conversion as doomed by unhappiness, boredom, 
lying, laziness, or unemployment.74 Yet, despite their insistence on describing 
the moment of revelation that changed their life as a clean and radial break 
from the past, converts need to preserve the imagination of their past as a form 
of constant motivation in their effort to cultivate a new and sincere faith. The 
vivid memory of their “sinful” pasts helps feeding the faith of newborn 
Christians and distinguishes their practice from the passive adhesion of nomi-
nal Christians.
Through their narratives, Algerian Christians relate in an ambiguous man-
ner to what they perceive as the dominant norms of religious behavior. These 
narratives are at once disruptive and conservative. As a disruptive event, con-
version is indeed a way for them to challenge these perceived norms, but their 
insistence on answering to potential accusations of subversion suggests that 
conversion narratives serve to simultaneously reinforce those norms. When 
claiming that they are Algerians and Christians, converts at once contest and 
reinforce the perceived presupposition according to which Christians can only 
be Westerners.
Rather than foment anti-Islamic sentiment, narratives of conversion aim at 
persuading an imaginary audience. For example, S., in a small village near 
Oran, constructed his narrative as an answer to what “they” think of converts: 
“There is a difference between a Christian and a French. My grandfather had 
lived in France. They think that all that is Western is Christian. They think 
that when we become Christian, we become decadent. As if we had become 
French. But with time, they see change in our life, they respect Christians. But 
first, they refuse.” Likewise, H., in Tizi, defined his identity by denying the 
validity of the way in which “they” present converts: “They blame us for being 
Zionists, anti-Arabs, anti-Palestinians. We are not Zionists. They don’t let us 
74) Karima Dirèche-Slimani, “Dolorisme religieux et reconstructions identitaires. Les conver-
sions néo-évangéliques dans l’Algérie contemporaine,” Annales 5 (September-October 2009): 
1137-63.
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express ourselves, so we used other medias. But, otherwise, we define ourselves 
as Christians. We are Catholics, because it’s universal, but not Roman 
Catholics. We are Protestants because we protest, evangelical because it is the 
call of God.” In other words, narratives of conversion are neither socially dis-
engaged accounts, nor mere disruptions of what new Christians perceive as 
norms of adequate religious behavior.
To the extent that they consistently orient their discourse toward an imag-
ined contradictor, converts also seek to respond to these norms. In their nar-
ratives, the converts’ own examples serve as an argument aimed at persuading 
the broader society. Historian Mercedes Garcia-Arenal describes the convert as 
“the autobiographer answering to this world in the way in which he is expected 
to do so.”75 The study of Algerian Christians’ narratives shows the dialogical 
dimension of the way in which these accounts are constructed and the 
relational imagination on which it is based. Even though they distinguish 
themselves from the rest of the society through the disruptive act of convert-
ing, Christians still want to answer to, and persuade, the rest of society. Their 
conversion is not simply a transgression of norms, but an attempt to account 
for how and why converts still belong to the normative society. The existence 
of the broader society is necessary to the cultivation of converts’ piety not 
only as a potential target of missionary efforts, but as an indispensable audi-
ence (be it real or imaginary) in front of which the sincerity of religious change 
can be proclaimed, tested, and, ultimately, made authentic. This compulsion 
towards public objectification is an endless process. Indeed, as Webb Keane 
articulates, “the nature of iterability means one can never be sure; the most 
earnest deeds and protestations of faith are in themselves but acting, mere 
words.”76
This simultaneous orientation of Christian narrative, toward both disrup-
tion and persuasion, is also apparent in the reluctance of many converts to use 
the actual word “conversion” to describe their experience. Most Christians 
I spoke with avoided using this word. When they conceded to do so, they 
made it clear that they viewed this word as one that inadequately described 
their experience, one unduly imported from a discussion of foreign religious 
changes. Most converts resorted to periphrases such as “I was freed by God,” 
“I was called by God,” “I saw Jesus in my dream,” “when I accepted to give my 
life to Jesus,” or more simply, “when I became Christian,” and “when I changed 
75) Mercedes Garcia-Arrenal, “Dreams and Reason: Autobiographies of Converts in Religious 
Polemics,” in Islamic Conversions. Religious Identities in Mediterranean Islam (Paris: Maisonneuve 
et Larose, 2001), 101 (emphasis added).
76) Keane, Christian Moderns, 288.
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religion.” Algerian Christians’ insistence on avoiding the word “conversion,” 
which strongly resonates with their uneasiness surrounding the word “reli-
gion,” suggests that they envision their path to Christianity as a lateral move 
for which they are not entirely responsible, rather than as a deliberate act of 
choosing a new faith. Furthermore, it again shows how inadequate the para-
digm of Islam versus Christianity is to a meaningful understanding of Algerian 
conversions.
Reconsidering the Boundaries of Algerian Citizenship
Although Protestant Christianity has been present in Algeria since the end of 
the 19th century, it was not until the early 21st century that converts have 
began to advocate an assertive form of collective representation as Christians 
and Algerians. The affirmation of this collective identity is based not only on 
the strong legal and public mobilization of converts during Christians’ trials; 
rather, it is an integral part of the religious discourse and practice that increas-
ingly link together the purification of the individual’s soul and the millenarist 
theme of the salvation of the nation. It is yet too early to draw any firm 
conclusion as to whether this millenarist engagement with the nation’s future 
will lead to the formation of more politicized mobilization, a form of political 
Christianity that would parallel and counter political Islam. For now, the orig-
inality of Algerian Evangelical Christianity, both intellectually and politically, 
lies in its ability to blur the lines between clear cut categories of religion, poli-
tics and secularism. As for state policy towards Christianity, this article has 
attempted to suggest that, no matter how alarming the number of trials and 
the close monitoring of which Christians are victims, the rights of Evangelicals 
cannot be treated separately from the broader question of religious freedom in 
general. In a context defined by the state’s attempt to monopolize religious 
practice and national symbols, the issue of Evangelical Christians cannot be 
singled out. Instead, it raises broader questions of religious and political plu-
ralism. Finally, the essentially ambiguous and divided aspect of state policy 
and of Algerian converts’ identity, both in how they approach their past and 
their fellow citizens, indicates that despite the unequal relations of power that 
define the state-convert relationship, the discourse of Christians, Muslims and 
the state is capable of meeting at certain points: they are not “co-authors,” who 
can talk to each other in an ideal speech situation, but they do “step into the 
same semiotic shoes.”77
77) Ibid., 287.
